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Myers: Criminal Law and Procedure

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
WViSTM MYMis) JR.*
I. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Right to Counsel
United States Supreme Court rulings since Gideon V. 'Wainwright1 have created new questions about the right to counsel.
This section will review these decisions with several of the recent
state and federal developments.
Of particular interest to South Carolina is White v. Maryland2
which held that a preliminary hearing was a critical stage when
the defendant could enter a plea of guilty, although there was
no requirement that he plead. South Carolina has steadily
maintained that counsel need not be appointed at the preliminary hearing distinguishing White v. Maryland on the grounds
that in this state the defendant cannot plead. 3 This view has

received strong support in United States ex rel. Cooper v.
4
Reinke.
The Connecticut hearing in probable cause has been accurately characterized as a mere "inquest" made to determine the existence of probable cause. .

.

. The finding of

probable cause is not final and it cannot be used against an
accused on the trial ....
The Connecticut hearing in probable cause cannot, therefore, be characterized as critical ....

Indeed, it can hardly

be termed a proceeding against the accused, to the contrary,
* Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.

1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Gideon, required that counsel be appointed to defend

indigents accused of crime. For a discussion, see Rogers, Criminal Law and
Procedure, 16 S.C.L. REv. 67 (1963). A companion case, Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353, (1963), extended the right of counsel to the first appeal.
We are not here concerned with problems that might arise from the denial
of counsel for the preparation of a petition for discretionary or mandatory
release beyond that state in the appellate process in which the claims have
once been presented by a lawyer and passed upon by an appellate process
in which the claims have once been presented by a lawyer and passed upon
by an appellate court. We are dealing only with the first appeal, granted
as a matter of right to rich and poor alike from a criminal conviction.

372 U.S. at 356.
2. 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
3. Moorer v. State, 244 S.C. 102, 138 S.E.2d 713 (1964); State v. White,
243 S.C. 238, 133 S.E2d 320 (1963). The South Carolina position is criticized
in Myers, Criminal Law and Procedure,17 S.C.L. Rlv. 35, 36-37 (1965).

4. 333 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1964).
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it appears to operate entirely for the accused's benefit. And
the mere fact that an accused is required to plead does not
in itself demand a contrary conclusion where the plea entered is a self-serving denial of guilt. At trial, appellant had
every opportunity to present any defense that was available
initially."
One of the leading cases in South Carolina, State v. Thite,6
has received federal approval. The federal district court noted:
Petitioner could not have made any plea or asserted any
defense at a preliminary hearing. He could have made no
statement that could have been used for him or against him.
There is no way in which petitioner could have been prejudiced in the conduct of his defense by failure to demand such
hearing. In fact, preliminary hearings in South Carolina
are for the benefit of the accused only, and is not part of any
proceeding against him.7
Still, conflict exists. A district court recently ruled that California must afford counsel at a preliminary hearing although no
plea could be entered.8 The preliminary hearing was considered
to be an initial adversary proceeding in which the accused may
discover important elements of the prosecutor's case and may
gain other strategic advantages.
It would be naive to assume that the United States Supreme
Court has had its last say on this issue. The South Carolina
view, while receiving considerable lower court support, is at best
unreliable. Caution requires that the accused be informed of his
right to counsel and counsel be appointed for indigents by the
magistrate before the decision about the preliminary hearing is
made. Perhaps the most effective argument in favor of counsel,
and one which has received no comment, is based upon the equal
protection clause. So long as the state permits a preliminary
hearing for all persons accused of crime, indigent defendants, as
well as the rich, should be afforded counsel at that stage. 9
5. 333 F.2d 608, 611-12 (2d Cir. 1964). This case expresses the majority

view in federal courts. See DeToro v. Peppersack, 332 F.2d 341 (4th Cir.
1964) ; Latham v. Crouse, 320 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1964).
6. 243 S.C. 238, 133 S.E.2d 320 (1963).
7. Williams v. South Carolina, 237 F. Supp. 360 (E.D.S.C. 1965).

8. Harris v. Wilson, 239 F. Supp. 204 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
9. This is the basis for decision in Douglas, supra note 1.
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Escobedo v. Illnois" has seriously questioned the practice of
extensively questioning suspects and obtaining confessions without the presence of counsel. In Escobedo the defendant had been
arrested and questioned for an extended period the night his
brother-in-law was shot. Late the next afternoon his lawyer
obtained his release. During this period of custody he made no
incriminatory statements, apparently insisting he knew nothing
of the crime. Over a week later, he was again taken into custody
and questioned. His lawyer arrived at the police station and
both he and the defendant requested that they be permitted to
discuss the matter, but the request was denied. The defendant
subsequently admitted participation in the crime. The United
States Supreme Court concluded that the confession should have
been ruled inadmissible.
Several passages from this important case suggest a number
of unanswered issues.
It is argued that if the right to counsel is afforded prior
to indictment, the number of confessions obtained by the
police will diminish significantly, because most confessions
are obtained during the period between arrest and indictment, and 'any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect
in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under
any circumstances.' This argument, of course, cuts two ways.
The fact that many confessions are obtained during this
period points up its critical nature as a 'stage when legal
aid and advice' are surely needed ....

The right to counsel

would indeed be hollow if it began at a period when few
confessions were obtained. There is necessarily a direct relationship between the importance of a stage to the police
in their quest for a confession and the criticalness of that
stage to the accused in his need for legal advice. Our Constitution, unlike some others, strikes the balance in favor
of the right of the accused to be advised by his lawyer of his
privilege against self-incrimination."
We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation
is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but
has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has
been taken into policy custody, the police carry out a process
of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating
10. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
11. Id. at 485.
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statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an
opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have
not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional
right to remain silent, the accused has been denied 'the Assistance of Counsel' ... and that no statement elicited by

the police during the interrogation may be used against him
at a criminal trial ....

12

We hold only that when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory-when its focus is on the accused and its
purpose is to elicit a confession-our adversary system begins to operate, and, under the circumstances here, the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer.' 3
Many questions are raised. Must the suspect be informed of
his right to counsel and, upon request, must counsel be afforded,
before intensive questioning? The defendant had consulted with
an attorney before his second arrest. Does this mean he has a right
to consult with his attorney again once "the process shifted
from investigatory to accusatory?" Must the suspect request
counsel before his right to counsel attaches?
Most jurisdictions have sharply limited Esoobedo. Several
cases suggest that the suspect's counsel must be trying to obtain
entrance into the interrogation room.'1 4 The most common re-

quirement is that the suspect must specifically request counsel.' 5
This latter view was embraced in Williams v. SoutAh Carolina'6
by the federal district court.
On the other hand, ample authority exists for a broad interpretation of Escobedo. People v. Dorado'17 has considered the
12. Id. at 490-91.
13. Id. at 492.
14. See State v. Fox, 131 N.W.2d 684 (Iowa 1964); State v. Howard, 383

S.W.2d 701 (Mo. 1964).

15. See, e.g., Duncan v. State, 176 So. 2d 840 (Ala. 1965) ; Montgomery v.
State, 176 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1965); Commonwealth v. Tracy, 207 N.E.2d 16

(Mass. 1965) ; Bran v. State, 398 P.2d 251 (Nev. 1965) ; Commonwealth ex reL.

Linde v. Maroney, 416 Pa. 331, 206 A.2d 288 (1965); Browne v. State, 24

Wis. 2d 491, 131 N.W.2d 169 (1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 1004 (1965). In
Hawaii, Escobedo was held not to require an immediate hearing before a
magistrate. See State v. Kitashiro, 397 P.2d 558 (Hawaii 1964).
16. Supra note 6.
17. 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361 (1965). cert. denied, 381 U.S. 937 (1965).
Other cases which have interpreted Escobedo broadly include United States
ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429 (3d Cir. 1965) ; State v. Hall, 397
P.2d 261 (Idaho 1964) ; State v. Neely, 395 P.2d 557 (Ore. 1964) ; State v.
Dufour, 206 A.2d 82 (RI. 1965). Also see Campbell v. State, 384 S.W.2d 4
(Tenn. 1964).
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failure to advise the suspect of his absolute right to remain
silent or the right to consult with counsel in violation of Escobedo.
The United States Supreme Court's lack of interest in clarifying
guides is evidenced by the denial of petitions for certiorari in
two cases at the opposite ends of the spectrum.' Until the dust
settles, law enforcement officers should be trained to advise
suspects of their rights to consult with counsel and to remain
silent at the earliest opportunity.
In Ew parte Glidden'9 the defendant did not have counsel
when he appeared before the federal commissioner. The district
court found that representation by counsel was not necessary.
The defendant must show that he requested counsel without being
informed of his right, or that he was prejudiced. Apparently
the court completely overlooked that provision of the federal
law20 which gives the defendant an unqualified right to counsel.
The court also failed to explain Rule 5 (b) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure 21 which requires the commissioner to inform the defendant "of his right to retain counsel, of his
right to request the assignment of counsel if he is unable to
obtain counsel."
The most perplexing problem of Gideon in South Carolina is
the state's failure to provide compensation for appointed counsel.
As an authority recently stated:
South Carolina is one of the few states where appointed
counsel are not compensated in either capital or non capital
cases. Thus, the lawyers who happen to be appointed are in

effect required to subsidize the administration of justice by
contributing their services and, in some instances, to lay out
cash for expenses of investigating and preparing the case,
22
conducting a trial or taking an appeal.
Only three states-Louisiana, Missouri and Kentucky-follow
this system and these have or are studying public defender sys23
tems for urban areas.
18. Compare People v. Dorado, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361 (1965), with
People v. Hartgraves, 31 Ill.
2d 375, 202 N.E.2d 33 (1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 961 (1965).
19. 240 F, Supp. 694 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
20. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A (b) (Supp. 1965).
21. FED. R. Caxm. P. 5(b).
22. Silverstein, The Continuing Impact of Gideon v. Wainwright on the

States, 51 A.B.A.J. 1023, 1025 (1965).

23. Ibid. There is pending a bill for an assigned counsel program in South
Carolina. See Comment, 17 S.C.L. Rev. 741 (1965).
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The failure to provide compensation cuts deeper than the fact
that the legal profession finances what should be recognized as
a public responsibility-counsel representation for the poor. The
overall quality of representation must suffer when a burden of
this magnitude is placed upon the bar. Indeed, Senator Ervin
of North Carolina has asserted that the failure to provide compensation for assigned counsel is in violation of the right to counsel.24 The South Carolina bar and legislature seemingly remain

indifferent about the problem of compensation. Apathy is hardly
a commendable quality for the state which ranks last in assuring
effective assistance of counsel.
Tillmam v. State25 revealed an astonishing factual situation
which involved questionable acts by the defense counsel. After
the defendant was arrested for murder, his wife approached the
counsel requesting representation. The defense counsel would
not agree to represent the defendant unless the defendant were
willing to enter a guilty plea. The defendant contended that
this "condition" to representation constituted a violation of due
process and tainted the voluntariness of the subsequent guilty
plea. The court rejected these arguments on the grounds that the
representation, although conditional, was voluntarily accepted
by the defendant. Such a conclusion must be based upon the
erroneous assumption that the defendant was able to make a
rational, bargained decision when pitted against his own prospective defense counsel.

More surprising is the court's implied condonation of the counsel's conduct. While a lawyer is free to decline any case, once
he accepts employment, he owes to his client the unqualified
obligation to present by all fair and honorable means every defense that the law permits, to the end that nothing be taken from
the accused save by the rules of law, legally applied. This duty
of fidelity is recognized in the Canons of Professional Ethics
adopted as part of the South Carolina Supreme Court Rules.
It is the right of the lawyer to undertake the defense of a
person accused of crime, regardless of his personal opinion
as to the guilt of the accused; otherwise innocent persons,
victims only of suspicious circumstances, might be denied
proper defense. Having undertaken such defense, the lawyer
24. Ervin, Unco,,pensated Counsel: They do Not Meet the Constitutional
Mansdate, A.B.A.J. 435 (1963).
25. 244 S.C. 259, 136 S.E.2d 200 (1964).
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is bound by all fair and honorable means, to present every
defense that the law of the land permits, to the end that no
persons may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law.26
Conditional representation subverts the lawyer's obligation.
Upon accepting employment he has already bargained away his
more important responsibilities.
Our legal system does not constitute the lawyer the judge
as to the justice or soundness of the causes committed to him,
but deems it in the ends of justice to have all the facts and
arguments on each side of the controversy presented by expert counsel, stimulated to a maximum of industry and ingenuity by the contest, for decision by the court and jury.
Experience has shown that in many cases a lawyer's first
impression of a case has turned out on further investigation
27
to be erroneous.
In Pitt v. AfacDougalZ2 8 the court concluded that the defendant
did not waive his right to the assistance of counsel where the
trial judge failed to advise him of his right. Intelligent waiver
requires knowledge and may not be presumed from a silent
record.
B. Search and Seizure
In State v. Hill 29 the sufficiency of an affidavit for a search
warrant was attacked on two grounds: (1) an informer was not
identified, and (2) insufficient facts appeared to establish the
reliability of the undisclosed source. 30 The defendant's contention that the informer's identify must be disclosed was rejected
because of the potential deleterious effect upon law enforcement.3 '
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

S.C. Sup. CT. R. 33(5).
Drinker, LEGAL ETHICS 142-43 (1953).
245 S.C. 98, 138 S.E.2d 840 (1964).
245 S.C. 76, 138 S.E.2d 829 (1964).
The affidavit stated the following:
Personally comes J. L. Tabor who being sworn, says that he is in-

formed by Informer and has good reasons to believe The occupants of 303

Haynie Street has concealed on his or her premises, or in his, her dwelling

or in a motor vehicle used by him or her at (sic) Has (sic) a quantity of
illegal whiskey.

Id. at 78, 138 S.E.2d at 830.
31. This view accords with the federal law. See Jones v. United States, 262

U.S. 257 (1960).
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An affidavit can comply with the sufficiency requirement
without identifying the informer. Sufficient facts may be alleged
so that the magistrate may weigh the information and its source
More important than the name of the informer is, "how well the
informer is known to the affiant; whether affiant has had previous dealings with the informer; whether past experience has
shown the informer to be reliable; the circumstances under which
the information was disclosed, and precisely what the information
was."3 2 Here the affidavit was factually barren. "The affidavit,
therefore, did not disclose anything which the issuing officer
could consider in arriving at a determination of whether there
was probable cause for the issuance of the warrant, which, in
effect, left the determination of probable cause to the judgment
and discretion of the police officer, rather than to the issuing
officer.13 3 Mapp v. Ohio34 required the evidence to be excluded.
This case is extremely important in clarifying affidavit requirements in South Carolina. In Aguilar v. Texas35 the federal
standard for affidavit sufficiency was imposed upon the states.
HZl suggests that the South Carolina Supreme Court has
adopted a conforming test.
C. Injunctions
In Petitionof Freeze3 7 an injunction was sought in the federal
district court to restrain the prosecuting authorities from pursuing a fraudulent check charge against the accused. The charge
had been pending since the spring of 1961. The accused alleged
he had been available for trial and the delay constituted a denial
of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The injunction was
refused because the accused failed to exhaust all state remedies.
32. 245 S.C. 76, 81, 138 S.E.2d 829, 831 (1964).
33. Ibid.
34. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
35. 378 U.S. 108 (1964). The affidavit in Aguilar was strikingly similar to
the affidavit in Hill. Mr. Justice Goldberg commented as follows:
Here the "mere conclusions" that petitioner possessed narcotics was not
even that of the affiant himself: it was that of an unidentified informant.
The affidavit here not only 'contains no affirmative allegation that the
affiant spoke with personal knowledge. For all that appears, the source
here merely suspected, believed or concluded that there were narcotics in
petitioner's possession. The magistrate here certainly could not 'judge
for himself the persuasiveness of the facts relied on ... to show probable
cause.' He necessarily accepted "without question" the informant's "suspicion', 'belief' or 'mere conclusion.'
36. State v. Hill, supra note 28.
37. 234 F. Supp. 427 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
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The issue of whether the accused was constitutionally denied
a speedy trial was never discussed. The sole basis for the decision
was whether the federal court is the proper forum. Another
serious question not discussed is whether injunctive relief is appropriate. Equity will not ordinarily interfere to prevent the
enforcement of the criminal law.38 It seems equally poor policy

to permit solicitors to hold stale criminal charges indefinitely.
This is an area that is in great need of clarifying legislation.
D. Preliminary Hearing
In Blandshaw v. State 9 the defendant alleged that he had
requested a preliminary hearing in writing pursuant to the
state statute but it was denied. The lower court ordered the
petition for writ of habeas corpus dismissed without a hearing.
The order was reversed. If the defendant properly requests a
preliminary hearing, the court of general sessions cannot acquire
jurisdiction until after the hearing. If the defendant can establish his allegations, then the court in which he was convicted
never had jurisdiction.
E. Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of the county court to try offenses was challenged in two cases. In State v. Douglas,41 the defendant objected to the transfer of a charge of driving a motor vehicle while
under the influence of intoxicants from the court of general
sessions to the county court. The county court clearly had concurrent jurisdiction to try the offense, but there was no authority
for the transfer. Since the court had clear jurisdiction over such
offenses, the court considered the jurisdictional objection waived
by the defendant when he failed to object and went to trial.
The defect was a lack of jurisdiction over the person which must
be raised at the earliest opportunity.
In Mosolygo v. State42 the county court tried the defendant
for housebreaking and grand larceny. The defendant objected
because the county court had a six man jury rather than a twelve
man jury. The writ of habeas corpus in the federal court was
38. See Buffalo Gravel Corp. v. Moore, 194 N. Y. Supp. 225, affd, 234 N.Y.
542, 138 N.E. 439 (1922).

39. 245 S.C. 385, 140 S.E2d 784 (1965).
40. S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-232 (1962).
41. 245 S.C. 83, 138 S.E.2d 845 (1964).
42. 240 F. Supp. 998 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
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denied on the grounds that no federal constitution issue was
raised. 43 It would seem the defendant was claiming he was
denied due process because of the jury being limited to six persons. Thus a more accurate ground for denial of the petition
was stated by the late Mr. Chief Justice Taylor of the South
Carolina Supreme Court-that due process does not preclude
a state from reducing the number of persons necessary to con44
stitute a jury.
F. Judge and Solicitor
In State v. Swilling4" the defendant's conviction for murder
was reversed because prejudicial evidence of character or reputation was introduced into the trial. Although the defendant never
placed his reputation in issue, the solicitor on several occasions
during cross-examination asked pointed questions about his
drinking and tendencies toward violence. In addition, the trial
judge instructed the jury that it could take into consideration the
bad reputation of the defendant. Although the judge recalled
the jury and instructed them to disregard that portion of the
charge, the prejudicial impact of the inadvertent instruction,
taken with the impropriety of the prosecutor, was too great to
overcome.
G. Sufficiency of the Elvidence
The two cases which turned on the sufficiency of evidence reflect the difficulty of prediction when this frequently used
ground of appeal is involved. In State v. Atkins4 6 a conviction
for receiving stolen goods was affirmed. The circumstantial evidence of the defendant's knowledge that the goods were stolen
was sufficient to submit the case to the jury. Here, the evidence
was that the "liquor was acquired, late at night, from a stranger
. . . in violation of liquor law, at a mere fraction of its selling
4 47
price, at an unorthodox place, with no inquiry as to its source. '
The defendant would have to show "a total failure of competent
43. Id. at 1003.
44. Ibid. Compare Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900), upholding a Utah
conviction by a jury of eight. The recent incorporation of various rights into
due process suggests this issue may be reconsidered by the United States
Supreme Court.
45. 246 S.C. 144, 142 S.E.2d 864 (1965).
46. 244 S.C. 213, 136 S.E.2d 298 (1964).

47. Ibid.
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evidence . . ." or the non-existence of evidence before reversal
can be obtained. 48 With such a burden on the defendant, reversal in any case would be unlikely.
Yet in State 'v. Gillian4 9 a conviction for housebreaking was
reversed without alluding to the Atkins "strong" language.
Evidence indicated that "a small pane of glass had been broken
from one of the windows and the window latch was in an unlocked position. He 'discovered' that a roll of five hundred five
cent stamps was 'missing' ....
A print on a fragment of the
glass pane.., was identified as having been made by one of the
defendant's fingers.150 The court did not consider this evidence
sufficient to establish "substantial evidence of guilt."
These cases suggest that the court has ample "precedent" for
whatever it decides to do when this issue is being considered.
In a close case, Atkins may require affirmance or Gilliam may
demand reversal, depending upon which course the court considers to be in accordance with justice.
H. Sentence
In State v. Petty51 the defendants were convicted of a conspiracy to violate a gambling statute. The South Carolina
statute52 provides "any person found guilty of the crime of
conspiracy shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not more than
five thousand dollars or to be imprisoned for not more than
five years.... ." Although the statute requires fine or imprisonment, in the alternative, the lower court imposed both confinement and a fine on each defendant. The sentence was reversed.
While the lower court had the discretion to fix either fine or
confinement or to give the defendant his choice, a sentence to both
exceeded the limits of the statute.
I. Probation and Parole
In Sanders v. MacDougall" the defendant was sentenced to a
term of five years, provided that upon the service of three years
the balance of the sentence was to be suspended. After serving
48. Id. at 216, 136 S.E2d at 300. See also State v. Smith, 245 S.C. 59, 138

S.E2d 705 (1964).

49. 245 S.C. 311, 140 S.E.2d 480 (1965).

50. Id. at 314, 140 S.E.2d at 481.
51. 245 S.C. 40, 138 S.E.2d 643 (1964).
52. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 16-550 (1962).

53. 244 S.C. 160, 135 S.E.2d 836 (1964).
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almost two years he was paroled until the expiration of the five
years. After three years, but before the expiration of the five
year term, the parole board purported to revoke the petitioner's
parole. The parole board's action was held void since it had no
jurisdiction after the expiration of the three year period the
defendant was required to serve. The defendant is considered
to be on probation during the time his sentence is suspended.
The courts have exclusive jurisdiction to revoke probation.
While released on parole a prisoner continues to serve his
sentence.
J. Aiscellaneous
Moorer v. MaoDougalI54 has entered another phase of adjudication. Several new grounds have been asserted, two of which may
attract attention. First, the defendant claims that the imposition
of the death penalty on a convicted rapist who has neither taken
nor endangered human life constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The court rejected this argument without meritorious
comment. In Rudolph v. Alabamaes Justices Goldberg, Black
and Douglas dissented from a denial of certiorari on this issue.
The constitutional objection to the death penalty under such
circumstances may well be considered in the near future.
Second, the defendant contends that the death penalty as applied to him was a denial of equal protection and due process
because in South Carolina the penalty has been reserved almost
exclusively for Negroes convicted of raping white women. The
court disposed of this issue on the grounds that statistical evidence that more Negroes than whites were sentenced to death
for rape does not show discrimination. 6
54. 245 S.C. 633, 142 S.E.2d 46 (1965). The selection of the jury was upheld

in Moorer v. State, 244 S.C. 102, 135 S.E.2d 713 (1964), surveyed in Myers,
Criminal Law and Procedure, 17 S.C.L. REV. 35, 39 (1965). The case is far
from final since the federal courts have agreed to review. See Moorer v. South
Carolina, 347 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1965).
55. 275 Ala. 115, 152 So. 2d 662, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 889 (1963).
56. An examination of statistics is interesting. The following are taken from
Sellin, The Death Penalty in the MODEL PENAL CODE, (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959):
Executions in the United States, 1930-1957, For Offenses Other Than
Murder
Negro
White
397
75
Total
41
370
Rape
38
363
Rape in the South
4
35
Rape in South Carolina

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol18/iss1/12

12

19661

Myers: Criminal Law and Procedure
CRmmiAL LAw AND PROCmm SURVEYED

In Grant v. MacDougall5 7 the defendant attempted to condition his request for a writ of habeas corpus upon the court
being willing to order his absolute release. The court agreed
that the lower court need not release the defendant, but rather
could make such disposition as the circumstances required. Any
defenses the defendant may have to a second trial must be raised
in that forum.
In State v. Swilling,5" the defendant's unlawful arrest was not
considered a grounds for discharge. A proper arrest warrant
was subsequently issued and seemingly the state did not obtain
evidence during the period of illegal detention.
In State v. SmitA59 the defense counsel's failure to object to
the charges given the jury and his failure to reserve other objections to the evidence waived any defects.

II. CRIHINAL LAW
A. Assault and Battery
6
State v. Moore60 and State v. HollmanP
- raised the issue of
whether the trial judge should charge the law of simple assault
and battery to the jury. In both cases, the defendants were convicted of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature.

Assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature is an
unlawful act of violent injury to the person of another, accompanied by circumstances of aggravation, such as the use
of a deadly weapon, the infliction of serious bodily injury,
the intent to commit a felony, the great disparity between
the ages and physical conditions of the parties, a difference
in the sexes, indecent liberties or familiarities with a female,
the purposeful infliction of shame and disgrace, resistance
62
of lawful authority, and others.
Simple assault and battery is an unlawful act of violent injury without aggravation. There must be evidence the lesser
offense is committed before the trial court should charge the jury.
57. 244 S.C. 387, 137 S.E.2d 270 (1964).

58. 246 S.C. 144, 142 S.E2d 864 (1965).
59. 245 S.C. 59, 138 S.E.2d 705 (1964).

60. 245 S.C. 416, 140 S.E2d 779 (1965).
61. 245 S.C. 362, 140 S.E.2d 597 (1965).
62. Id. at 364, 140 S.E2d at 598.
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In HoZlma the state's evidence established that the thirtythree year old defendant attacked a seventeen year old girl with
a knife. The defendant's evidence completely denied the charge.
The court correctly upheld the trial judge's refusal to charge the
lesser offense. Only two alternatives were available-acquittal
or assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature.
In Moore the state's evidence indicated the defendant's car
rammed the victim's car and the defendant then struck the
victim with a metal object inflicting serious injury. The defendant's evidence raised doubts about whether the car or a metal
object was used and about the seriousness of the injury. Although
the defendant used the alibi defense, he attempted to rebut the
circumstances of aggravation. The court concluded that the
trial court erred in not submitting the lesser charge upon request.
B. Offenses Against Property
In State v. AmersoP 3 the jury considered whether the defendant was guilty of grand larceny and housebreaking. He
was convicted for housebreaking but acquitted of grand larceny.
On appeal the defendant claimed that the verdicts were inconsistent. The claim was rejected because it "is not essential to the
commission of the crime of housebreaking that one commit grand
larceny. It is sufficient that the one breaking and entering did
so with the intent to commit any crime." 64 The jury could have
concluded the defendant was guilty of petit larceny.
In State v. White 5 the defendant was convicted of breach of
trust with fraudulent intent on an indictment which related
that the victim left a tractor and dump trailer with the defendant
and that he appropriated the equipment to his own use. The
equipment was left with the defendant so that he could sell it.
The equipment was sold as authorized but the victim never received his share of the proceeds. The conviction was reversed
because the indictment was at variance with the evidence. At
most, the defendant was guilty of a fraudulent conversion of
the proceeds of the sale, not the equipment. Consequently, he
was entitled to have the indictment accurately state the accusation
against him.
63. 244 S.C. 374, 137 S.E2d 284 (1964).
64. Id. at 379, 137 S.E.2d at 286. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-332 (1962) provides

that the intent required is to commit "a felony or other crime of a lesser grade."

65. 244 S.C. 349, 137 S.E2d 97 (1964).
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